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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
CALLA E. JACKMAN, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
v. ) No. 18369 
DALE L. JACKMAN, ) 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce dividing the marital property and awarding support. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court awarded appellant alimony in the sum 
of $850.00 per month (R. J57) after determining respondent had 
an annual gross income of $29,000 and a net annual income, 
after taxes, of $19,600 {R. 151), a 1979 Oldsmobile, the 
household furniture, fixtures and furnishings located in the 
family home at 2156 Elaine Drive and the family home subject to 
a $10,000 lien in favor of the respondent which was not to bear 
interest or be payable until the death of the plaintiff or sale 
of the home (R.156-157). Appellant was also awarded such: 
(R. 157). 
Interests, if any, as the Plaintiff has, or 
may have had, in Future Development Company, 
a Utah Corporation; in the Salt Lake 
International Center; in any Bara 
Corporation or Bara Partnership; and/or in 
any profits from any of those corporations 
or partnerships. 
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Respondent was awarded the 1980 Chrsyler LeBaron, the 1972 Ford 
pick-up truck, the Kawasaki motorcycle, the office equipment 
and furnishings at Baseline Appraisal (his business), the 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance policy with its cash value, the 
$10,000 money market certificate at Valley Bank and Trust 
Company, the $J3,500 in receivables of Baseline Appraisal, the 
funds in his IRA account ($3,608.00), all right, title and 
interest of the parties in Lot 84, Brown's Park Subdivision, 
Bountiful, Davis County, Utah and the $10,000 lien on the 
family home. {R. 156). 
Respondent was ordered to pay all debts incurred by 
the parties during the course of their marriage (R. 156), 
$1,500.00 for the benefit of plaintiff's attorney {R. 157) and 
costs of $1,066.65 {R. 179). 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the trial court's 
decision and an award of his costs and attorney fees on 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appel.lant set forth a statement of facts in great 
length and detail. Respondent would accept that statement as 
supplemented by the following specific additions. 
Appellant takes the position that defendant had some 
interest in the Salt Lake International Center, Bara 
-2-
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partnerships or Bara corporations, and/or Future Development 
Company. It was over this issue that the matter went into such 
extended, complex discovery and trial. Respondent testified on 
direct and cross examinat]on, repeatedly, that he had no 
interest in Future Development Company, although he tried, by 
every means he knew how, to raise the money or secure enough 
savings from the construction to create such an interest for 
himself (R.262-276, 278-280, 283-321, 345-354, 360-371, 
373-383, 392, 395-6, and 404-407). Gordon Gregson, the primary 
owner of Future Development Company, testified that respondent 
had no interest in Future DeveJopment Company (R. 480) as he 
was never able to do what was required of him in order to 
obtain such an interest (R. 48J). 
Mr. Jackman further testified that he had been able to 
secure no interest in any Bara entity, although he tried to do 
so and documents were executed which apparently gave him such 
an interest (R. 267, 321-344, 392-393, 396-398). 
Finally, respondent testified that he had no interest 
in any of the Salt Lake International Center partnerships (R. 
371-373, 387-389, 393-395, 399-402). 
The trial court found respondent had no interest in 
these entities but awarded appellant all interest respondent 
owned, may have owned or may ever own in those entities (R. 
157). Appellant makes this ruling the primary issue in her 
-3-
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appeal. She feels the Court should have found respondent owned 
such interests awarded them to him and ordered respondent to 
pay her an appropriate equalizing sum of money. She does not 
accept the ruling or award of the court and asserts this is 
error - assertions presented to and not accepted by the trial 
court. 
The problem is probably best underscored by Judge 
Banks explaining what he understood transpired and the 
appellant's response thereto (R. 314). The Court stated that 
the appellant may have demonstrated inconsistent statements by 
the respondent, but that did not constitute substantive 
evidence of an ownership in the business entities (R. 
425-427). 
Respondent consistently maintained in al] testimony 
and on all cross examination that he tried to obtain interests 
in Future DeveJopment and various Bara entities, but was never 
able to do so. The testimony of Mr. Gregson and the failure of 
appellant to produce any direct contrary evidence negate the 
argument of Appellant. 
Appellant also raises the issue of the court's 
decision refusing to award child support. Respondent 
testified, without rebuttal, that the minor child was 
emancipated and employed (R. 384). 
Appellant further raises an issue as to the amount of 
-4-
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alimony awarded. Before the court were copies of the tax 
returns of the parties (R. 54-102). The testimony of the 
respondent as to the income produced by Baseline Appraisal, his 
sole source of earnings at the time of tria] are in accord with 
the finding of the court (R.386-388, 483-494). Respondent 
testified that it took him two years to build up the 
extraordinary income that appeared in 1979 (R. 261-262). 
While the appellant testified that she needed $1,600 
per month, she admitted that she had not been spending that sum 
as she had been living and supporting herself and the minor 
child of the parties on the temporary support of $1,000.00 per 
month (R. 253). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS, DETERMINATIONS AND 
DECISIONS ARE CORRECT 
This Court has repeatedly held that the trial court has an 
advantaged position in considering the evidence before it, has 
had the opportunity to hear witnesses testify, watch their 
demeanor and view nonverba] testimony. Thus, absent a cJear 
abuse of discretion in division of the marital property and 
income the trial court's determinations should be affirmed. 
Turner v. Turner 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982); Dority v. Dority, 645 
P.2d 56 (Utah 1982); Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 
1980); Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979). In 
the instant case, the wisdom of this rule is apparent. 
-5-
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The appellant asserts error in that the trial court 
allowed the respondent to hide assets from the appellant. 
Counsel for respondent, throughout the pretrial proceedings and 
the trial itself, constantly pointed out to the counsel for the 
appellant, as well as the court, that the respondent had no 
interest in any of the claimed business entities. Respondent 
not only said that he did not have these assets (if he did, 
respondent would be entitled to half, and appellant wouJd be 
entitled to half), but, both in comment and formal proffer, he 
stated that appellant could have all interest that he might 
have or ever could have in the businesses, Future Development 
Company, any Bara partnership or corporation and the Salt Lake 
International Center (R. l80, 191, 192-193, 313, 392, 394, 
395). The trial court and respondent, nevertheless, were 
forced to endure several days of trial while appellant tried to 
establish that respondent owned some hidden interest in these 
entities. 
Ironically, appellant even raises the point that 
respondent refused a polygraph test and makes an issue of that 
action but does not make a correct representation of what 
occurred. Examination of the transcript (R. 189-192) 
demonstrates that respondent felt and asserted to the court 
through his counsel, that if he took a polygraph test as 
appellant insisted, it was because he was trying to prove he 
was not lying. This would denegate the role of the trial court 
-6-
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as the finder of fact which included the issue of his veracity 
(R. 189-190). Accordingly, he made the offer that he would 
take a polygraph examination if appellant, when it demonstrated 
that respondent was telling the truth, would then accept the 
proposed settlement made by respondent (R. 190). This was 
rejected by appellant (R. 190). 
The crucial issue in this case was credibility. This 
was established at the outset of trial as an issue and remained 
such throughout the trial. This court can determine only 
through examination of testimony as reported on the pages of 
the transcript and the documents admitted into evidence what 
occurred. The trial court saw and heard the witnesses, 
observed their demeanor and could consider their nonverbal 
conduct while testifying. That is all denied to this Court 
yet it is critical to a determination of veracity and 
credibility. 
Respondent, throughout his testimony, stated that the 
documents were correct, that they demonstrated an effort on his 
part to secure an interest in some business so that he would 
own a "piece of the action." However, they also demonstrate 
that he was never able to do so. The issue of the credibility 
of this testimony as well as the issue of the burden of proving 
that respondent did own some interest in these business 
entities was thus the major issue presented to the trial 
-7-
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court. On those questions the trial court ruled against 
appellant. She now attacks both the decision and Judge Banks, 
insisting that he was sick and did not pay attention to her 
evidence. This she places in her brief but cites no authority 
as this is not part of the record. 
Respondent would point to four specific exchanges 
which demonstrate what occurred. 
Early in her testimony appellant offered, through a 
written exhibit, a description of her medical history. Counsel 
for respondent agreed to stipulate to its admission as 
illustrative of her testimony. After accepting that 
stipulation, appellant insisted upon going item by item through 
the history and explaining it in detail (R. 221-225). The 
trial court asked the appellant to please deal with her present 
medical condition as that was what was relevant but continued 
to have difficulty in obtaining that information as appellant 
wanted to repeat a complete history (R. 225-226) • 
A similar exchange dealt with the work history of the 
respondent. The appellant tried to go through that in detail 
and when the court advised counsel for the appellant that he 
understood, having heard numerous condemnation actions that was 
involved in the training of an MAI apprai.ser, counsel for the 
appellant wanted to proceed with the historical presentation of 
his case, anyway (R. 257-258). 
-8-
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After all parties and the court had to sit through a 
very repetitious examination, the court observed to counsel for 
the appellant that he was being repetitious. This was 
acknowledged by counsel for the appellant, who kept doing so 
(R.326). 
The final example is the court's observation that 
counsel for the appellant may have demonstrated that respondent 
in some way had not told the truth in executing certain 
documents or in taking actions on behalf of the businesses in 
which he was trying to secure an interest but that did not 
establish that he had an interest in that business. The 
colloquy between court and counsel speaks eloquently for itself 
in demonstrating that this was a distinction appellant was 
never able to discern (R. 425-427). It is that failure which 
produced the extensive discovery, the prolonged trial and this 
appeal. 
In fact, examination of the transcript demonstrates 
the extreme patience of the court in allowing counsel for the 
appellant to spend the better part of two days going into 
matters which were totally irrelevant in order to give 
appellant an opportunity to establish that the respondent had 
some interest in the business entities which he denied that he 
owned. This was pursued, not in order to secure an interest of 
the appellant in these properties, because that had been 
offered to her repeatedly (R. 180, 191, 192-193, 313, 392, 394, 
-9-
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395): it was to try to have some other property or money 
awarded to the appellant. 
Under these circumstances, the ability to observe the 
parties, the conduct of counsel and the testimony and demeanor 
of the witnesses is critical. In order to cover her failure in 
the trial court to meet that burden, appellant has chosen to 
attack the tria] judge and his conduct of the trial in the 
brief without making any record at the time that this was 
occurring or indicating any prejudice at the time. Now, it is 
simply asserted by appel]ant, through her counsel in his brief, 
not only with no support in the record, but to obfuscate the 
fact that the trial court ruled correct]y on the evidence and 
should be affirmed by this Court. There is no evidence 
contrary to the findings of the Court -- only appellant's 
assertions. 
II. 
PROPERTY SHOULD BE FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY DIVIDED 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
This court has repeatedJy held that marital property 
and income should be fairly and equitably divided between the 
parties. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 201 (Utah 1983): Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982) and authorities cited and 
discussed (649 P.2d at 6). In the instant matter, the trial 
court did so. It awarded the "disputed property" pursuant to 
the proffer of respondent, fully and completely to appellant. 
-10-
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Then, looking at the remaining properties and income, it 
divided them fairly and equi.tably. The most substantial asset 
of the parties, their home, was awarded to the appellant. 
Properties of a cumulative, slightly less value, were awarded 
to the respondent. 
Although the respondent received slightly less in 
value than appellant, he makes no challenge to this award, 
believing that it is well within the rules of fair and 
equitable division established by this court. Respondent 
recognized that the only way the trial court's award could be 
attacked was if this court determined that respondent, in some 
way, owned interest in some other property as asserted by the 
appellant. This is not true, was never established by her, and 
was continuaJly denied by respondent and by the witnesses as 
called by the appellant in the presentation of her case, 
particu]arly, Mr. Gregson, the principal of Future Development 
Company. 
The alimony award was fair. This court has ruled 
repeatedly that alimony is to maintain a spouse in as nearly as 
possib]e the same condition as she was during the marriage. It 
is not to punish the other party nor reward a spouse. Savage 
v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983); Warren v. Warren, 655 
P.2d 684, 687-698 (Utah l982); Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 
58-59 (Utah 1982). As the trial court said in summing up 
-11-
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••• (T)he Court has to look at it as the 
need and the ability to pay and in no 
instance to I know of a justification to go 
over fifty-fifty and really, wjth her 
getting the home, the expenses of him being 
able to live, being practical, is going to 
cost him more than it is her to occupy the 
house and in effect she is paying rent for 
$220 a month and it's pretty hard for him to 
even get a place for 220 of any practicality. 
(R. 528-529.) 
The court, after hearing the evidence and considering 
the tax returns, found that the respondent had net income of 
$19,600 a year. That was the court's finding after hearing the 
evidence as to respondent's present earnings. The respondent 
had a gross income of $29,000 and a net income of $19,600. If 
the net is divided by the 12 months of the year, it can be seen 
the court determined that respondent had net income of 
$1,633.33 per month and yet (violating his own declaration), 
awarded slightly more than 50 percent of that, or $850.00 per 
month, to the appellant. 
Respondent would admit that he had earned more money 
in the past and he would certainly hope that he could earn more 
in the future. His earnings in the past had come from dual 
occupations -- employment plus appraisal fees. Employment had 
been terminated and he was now making his living solely by 
appraisal fees at the time of trial. 
Respondent had attempted to secure an interest for 
himself in business by use of his skill as he did not have 
-12-
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money for investment. His efforts did not come to fruition 
and, as a result, his income dropped as he had substantial 
uncompensated work. This is described in his testimony in 
response to appellant's repeated questions about his interests 
in the business entities, Future Development Company, the Bara 
partnerships, and the Salt Lake International Center. The 
appellant, without offering any evidence of present income or 
assets other than those found to exist, challenges their 
division. The assertions are without basis or merit and this 
court should affirm the trial court. 
III. 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Counsel for the appellant testified at the conclusion of 
appellant's case as to the extent of his work in preparing for 
trial and in conducting the trial (R. 483-485). He sought more 
than $10,000 in attorney's fees for this effort. The trial 
court most succinctly described the situation and the request 
for attorney's fees: 
As to the time spent in this, I think it is 
ridiculous. As to the costs incurred, I 
think it's ridiculous. She is entitled to 
attorney's fees. I can't fix what you 
charge her, but I can make an award toward 
those attorney's fees, which I intend to do, 
but they're not going to be within the realm 
of what -- and the costs, the same way. 
They're not going to be within the realm of 
what you think you're entitled to. $10,000 
attorney's fees and 15, $1,600 costs. You 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(R. 527). 
have to look at the sjtuation of what you 
are able to accomplish and what was 
necessary in order to do this. 
If anyone is entitled to attorney fees in this matter, 
it would be respondent. The appellant has taken evidence of a 
series of business efforts which failed on the part of 
respondent and tried to project those into successes. When 
supporting evidence was not developed, the matter was dragged 
out interminably. Attorney's fees have been incurred by 
respondent who had no choice but to def end himself from what 
the trial court recognized was a ridiculous attack. It was bad 
enough that this matter was so extensively tried; it was aJso 
appealed. Now appellant seeks further attorney's fees for 
prosecuting this appeal. Not only should these be denied, 
respondent should be awarded his attorney's fees and costs as 
incurred in this frivolous appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This is a matter that has been blown out of all 
proportion by the appellant. It is a case which should have 
been a simple divorce but has been expanded beyond all reason. 
Eighteen depositions of people or for documents were taken (R. 
109-116, 124-127, 131, 136). Two envelopes in the record on 
appeal are required to hold all of the paper exhibits in this 
matter. All of them demonstrate precisely what the respondent 
-14-
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told counsel for the appellant at the beginning and throughout 
the case that the only assets held by the parties were their 
home and an investment lot and some cash. The cash, 
ironically, was burned up in paying bills of the parties and 
trying to handle the costs of the litigation. 
This court observed in Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 
1201, 1205-1206 (Utah 1983), that to award substantial 
attorney's fees decreases the property awarded to one party or 
another. Respondent, to pay his own fees has suffered this 
injury. The matter has been blown out of all proportion and 
pursued to a ridiculous extent by appellant which her request 
for attorney's fees clearly demonstrates. The appellant was 
awarded slightly over one-half of the net income of the 
respondent and property of the parties. He did not appeal, as 
he felt the matter should be over and he could live with it. 
The property was divided fairly and equitably between 
the parties and the respondent accepted the fact that he would 
have to pay some of the attorneys' fees and some of his 
property would have to be liquidated to pay debts and 
expenses. He knew he could earn a living and more income than 
appellant so he accepted the ruling as falling within the 
guidelines established by this Court. The appeal of the 
appellant is frivolous. She seeks to be awarded property never 
owned by the parties. She refuses to accept the facts as they 
-15-
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exist. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court 
and award the respondent both his costs and the attorney's fees 
he has been forced to incur in defending this appeal. 
u 
DATED this I r-aay of ~· , 1983. 
C[)~d~ 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
"" 
the foregoing Brief have been mailed, this ~day of May, 
1983, to Joel Allred, 500 American Savings Building, 61 South 
Ma.in Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, attorney for 
appellant. 
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